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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellee Doris Keating agrees with the statement of jurisdiction contained in Appellant Iola Patton's principal brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature Of The Case, Course Of The Proceedings, And
Disposition Below.
Mrs. Patton filed this action against Mrs. Keating for
personal injuries allegedly sustained in a rear-end automobile
collision in January 1992.

(R. 2 ) . After a three-day trial in

January 1995, the jury found Mrs. Keating fifty one per cent
negligent and Mrs. Patton forty nine per cent negligent.
8, 189-90).

The jury awarded $3,500.00 in damages.

(R. 86-

(R. 189-90).

Mrs. Patton filed a motion for a new trial on the bases that
the damages awarded were grossly inadequate and that the trial
court improperly excluded a portion of her intended cross
examination of Mrs. Keating.

(R. 199-203).

denied the motion and this appeal followed.
B.

The trial court
(R. 231).

Statement Of Facts.
1.

AFTER BEING INVOLVED IN A LOW-IMPACT COLLISION,
MRS. PATTON FILED A LAWSUIT FOR OVER ONE MILLION
DOLLARS.

On January 14, 1992, Mrs. Patton drove a friend to the Lost
Creek apartment complex in Murray.

(R. 249, 280). She parked on

the wrong side of a road in the complex, in a no-park area next
to a curb, and remained in the car while her friend conducted
business with a resident.

(R. 282, 302).

It was "pitch dark" at

the time, and the condition of the road was icy and snow-covered.
(R. 280, 282, 288, 314).

Mrs. Keating had just dropped off a friend in another area
of the apartment complex parking lot.

(R. 311). As she was

turning a corner to leave the complex, her car began to slide.
(R. 313). She applied her brakes but slid into the rear of
Mrs. Patton's vehicle.

(R. 313). Mrs. Keating described the

accident as unavoidable.

(R. 318). Although Mrs. Patton main-

tained at trial that Mrs. Keating was speeding, Mrs. Keating's
statement that she was travelling at a very low rate of speed,
about five miles per hour, was confirmed by expert testimony and
by the minimal amount of damage to the vehicles.

(R. 210, 2 89,

314-315).
The parties exited their vehicles to inspect for damage and
did not find any on either vehicle.
also stated that she was not hurt.

(R. 288, 316). Mrs. Patton
(R. 316-17, 320). She subse-

quently filed a personal injury suit against Mrs. Keating seeking
payment of alleged medical expenses and one million dollars in
general damages.
2.

(R. 4 ) .

THE JURY DETERMINED THAT MRS. PATTON SUSTAINED
$3,500.00 WORTH OF DAMAGE.

Mrs. Patton claimed at trial that she was forced to drop out
of Salt Lake Community College and lost a Pell Grant as a result
of the accident.

(R. 274, 278).

She attempted to introduce

evidence that she incurred medical expenses of $23,000.00, but it
was excluded for lack of foundation.

(Re 277-8).

She introduced

a physician's certification of permanent total disability, but

-2-

later admitted on cross examination that she worked out two hours
a day at the Holiday Health Spa.

(R. 278, 307).

Mrs. Patton attempted to present expert testimony regarding
the circumstances of the accident through Don Remington.
(R. 211). However, Mr. Remington conceded on cross examination
that he had limited knowledge about the accident, having only
learned of it a few days before trial and having only learned
Mrs. Patton's version of events.

(R. 211). By contrast, expert

accident reconstructionist Newell Knight testified for
Mrs. Keating.

(R. 210). He explained that the bumper and seats

of Mrs. Patton's vehicle were designed to absorb force from a
collision and thereby prevent injury.
Two physicians testified at trial.

(R. 210-11).
(R. 212). Dr. Wood, who

treated Mrs. Patton after the accident, diagnosed her with merely
a lumbar spasm or strain.

(R. 211). Dr. Foley noted that while

Mrs. Patton reported "an acute onset of radiculopathy" following
surgery unrelated to the accident, this condition was not connected to the accident.

(R. 211). Dr. Schwartz, who performed

back surgery on Mrs. Patton after the accident, was not called to
testify.

(R. 211). All treating physicians agreed that their

diagnosis relied heavily on the subjective symptoms reported by
Mrs. Patton.

(R. 212).

At the close of evidence, counsel delivered their closing
arguments.

Mrs. Patton never objected to any portion of

Mrs. Keating's closing argument.

(R. 251-264).

After the jury

rendered its verdict awarding $3,500 in special damages and no
-3-

general damages, Mrs. Patton did not request that the jury be
directed to reconsider the amount of special or general damages.
(R. 213).
Mrs. Patton filed a motion for a new trial shortly afterwards, asserting only that the damages awarded were inadequate
and contrary to the evidence, and that she should have been able
to question Mrs. Keating regarding alcohol consumption merely
because Mrs. Keating attended a Veteran of Foreign Wars function
before the accident.1

(R. 199-203).

The court denied the

motion.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I:

The trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in

precluding Mrs. Patton from questioning Mrs. Keating on alcohol
consumption.

Mrs. Patton had no foundation to pursue the line of

questioning and made no viable proffer of admissible evidence.
POINT II:

The jury's assessment of fault and damages was well

supported by the evidence presented.

Mrs. Patton cannot receive

a new trial simply because she did not receive a favorable
outcome the first time around.
POINT III:

Mrs. Patton's attack on Mrs. Keating's closing

argument, raised for the first time on appeal, lacks merit.

The

*Mrs. Patton attempted to ask Mrs. Keating on cross
examination whether the Veterans of Foreign Wars served alcohol
at functions. (R. 249). The trial court precluded questions
regarding alcohol consumption on the grounds of unfair surprise
and prejudice; Mrs. Patton did not raise the subject of alcohol
consumption until trial, and there was no evidence that Mrs.
Keating had been drinking.
(R. 249-251).
-4-

closing argument did not violate the open courts provision.

The

last twenty minutes of the trial did nothing to erase the existence of Mrs. Patton's day, or three days, in court.

Moreover,

there was no constitutional infringement because there was no
state action.

Neither was the closing argument "grossly

improper"; asking the jury to question whether a one million
dollar verdict is warranted in light of the flimsy evidence
presented lies well within the expansive boundaries of
appropriate closing argument.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE
ITS BROAD DISCRETION IN PRECLUDING
A LINE OF QUESTIONING FOR WHICH THERE
WAS NO GOOD FAITH BASIS.
Although Mrs. Patton had absolutely no evidence that
Mrs. Keating had been drinking before the accident, she nonetheless attempted to create that inference at trial by asking
Mrs. Keating about the Veterans of Foreign Wars.

It is a

fundamental rule of cross-examination that parties cannot
question witnesses about a subject without a good faith belief to
support the questioning.

The trial court acted properly in

halting the fishing expedition.
A. Mrs. Patton's Intended Line Of Questioning Lacked
Foundation.
The following exchange occurred during cross examination of
Mrs. Keating:

-5-

Q:

Now my understanding is that evening you had been at a
meeting with the Veteran of Foreign Wars?

A:

The Foreign Wars, yes, Auxiliary.

Q:

Now do the Veterans of Foreign Wars, do they serve
alcohol at their various functions?

Mr. Lund: Objection, there's no evidence whatsoever of any
alcohol consumption here and it's inappropriate for
him to ask that now.
The Court: I would sustain.

(R. 249).

The question was properly excluded for two reasons.

First,

it would have been wholly inadequate to support a reasonable
inference that Mrs. Keating was under the influence of alcohol
when the accident occurred.

The only claimed "foundation" for

this line of questioning is Mrs. Patton's assertion that the
Veterans of Foreign Wars is "very well known" to serve alcoholic
beverages.

(Appellant's Brief at p. 16).

She has never

proffered affidavits or other evidence to establish this alleged
fact.

Yet she sought to imply to the jury from this unsupported

fact that Mrs. Keating must have been drinking before the
accident. The trial court appropriately prevented Mrs. Patton
from using the bare assertion that the Veterans of Foreign Wars
serves alcohol as a springboard to implying that Mrs. Keating was
intoxicated.

See State v. Sorenson, 619 P.2d 1185, 1191 (Mont.

1980) (mere assumption of counsel that witness was under
influence of drugs is insufficient foundation to ask about drug use). 2
2

Mrs. Patton incorrectly cites Sorenson as support for her
notion that questioning about alcohol use is always fair game.
(Appellant's Brief at 15). The other cases cited for this notion
-6-

Second, Mrs. Patton intended to create this prejudicial
inference without even knowing whether Mrs. Keating actually had
consumed alcohol that evening.

Utah Rule of Evidence Rule 103(2)

(attached as Addendum A) provides that error may not be predicated on a ruling which excludes evidence unless the substance of
the excluded evidence has been made known to the court by an
offer of proof.

Mrs. Patton never submitted an offer of proof

concerning Mrs. Keating's use of alcohol.

Without this offer of

proof, the court never had an opportunity to determine if there
was specific admissible evidence regarding use of alcohol and
properly excluded the line of questioning.

See State v. Rammel,

721 P.2d 298, 499 (Utah 1986); Bradford v. Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d
1240, 1243 (Utah 1980) (appellate court cannot say that exclusion
of evidence was error without proffer).
A party may not ask a witness a prejudicial question in
front of the jury without having good-faith knowledge of what the
answer is.

In People v. Vialpando, 804 P.2d 219 (Colo. App.

1990), defense counsel attempted to ask a rape victim questions
about her prior sexual activities without knowing whether she had
in fact been sexually promiscuous.

Approving the trial court's

exclusion of these questions, the court noted that counsel
may not properly propound to a witness questions which
can cause a doubt in the jury's mind as to the witness'
are similarly unavailing. See State v. Mitchell, 571 P.2d 1351
(Utah 1977) (known heroin dealer could be asked about heroin
use); State v. Tucker, 800 P.2d 819 (Utah App. 1990) (witness
could be questioned about cocaine use for limited purpose of
impeachment).
-7-

credibility when there is no reasonable basis in fact
for that interrogation.
804 P.2d at 223.
Just as it would have been prejudicial to ask the rape victim in
Vialpando whether she had been sexually promiscuous, it would
have been inappropriate to ask Mrs. Keating if she had been
drinking.3

Regardless of what the witness' answer might have

been, an inference of drinking would have been already been
created by the mere asking of the inflammatory question.

See

Lily v. Scott, 598 P.2d 279, 283 n.3 (Okla. App. 1979) (improper
questions having for their sole purpose the casting of
reflections upon the character of witnesses is prejudicial
conduct).
B. Mrs. Patton Has Not Demonstrated That The Preclusion, If
Improper, Had A Substantial Effect On The Trial's Outcome.
Even if this Court determines that Mrs. Patton should have
been allowed to question Mrs. Keating without foundation and
without a good faith basis, a new trial is still unwarranted.
Improperly excluded evidence becomes reversible error only if it
can be shown that the exclusion had a substantial effect on the
trial's outcome.

Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789,

796 (Utah 1991).
Mrs. Patton has not suggested, much less demonstrated, that
a different outcome would have been probable had she questioned

3

As a practical reality, Mrs. Patton obtained this prejudicial effect by, without reasonable notice, asking Mrs. Keating
whether the Veterans of Foreign Wars served alcohol.
-8-

Mrs. Keating about alcohol consumption.

To the contrary, evi-

dence that Mrs. Keating consumed alcohol before the accident, if
it had any effect at all, would have weighed upon Mrs. Keating's
degree of negligence.

Even if Mrs. Patton could prove that the

jury would have found Mrs. Keating 100% negligent had she been
able to pursue her line of questioning, damages would have
remained $3500.00. Mrs. Keating would have then been responsible
for the entire damages amount rather than just 51% of it, but the
damages still would have been "grossly inadequate," as Mrs.
Patton calls them.

Mrs. Patton complains on appeal that the

jury's damages award was grossly inadequate compared to the
amount of injury she suffered, yet evidence of intoxication
properly could only have affected amount of liability, not
damages.

Mrs. Patton has done nothing to suggest, as is her

burden, that the outcome would have been different had she been
permitted to question about alcohol consumption.

Instead, any

error on the part of the trial court was harmless.
This Court should not order a new trial on the basis of the
limited cross examination.

The trial court, in a unique position

to assess the relevance and prejudicial effect of evidence, acted
properly in preventing the unsubstantiated and inflammatory
interrogation from reaching the jury.
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POINT II
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT THE VERDICT.
Mrs. Patton's bald assertion that the verdict lacked any
support in the evidence is meritless.

In her one-page "argument"

that the evidence was insufficient, she simply notes that when a
verdict is "obviously unreasonable and unjust," the appellate
court may reverse it.

(Appellant's Brief at 16-17).

However,

she fails to explain how the verdict in this case was
unreasonable and unjust, leaving this Court nothing to review for
injustice.
A.

Mrs. Patton Has Failed To Marshal The Evidence.

A jury verdict may be reversed only if, "viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, there is no
substantial evidence to support it."
P.2d 86, 88 (Utah 1985).

In re Estate of Kesler, 702

An appellant challenging a jury verdict

must marshal all evidence supporting the verdict and show that
evidence is insufficient to support the verdict even when viewed
in the light most favorable to the verdict.

W. Fiberglass v.

Kirton, McConkie and Bushnell, 789 P.2d 34 (Utah App. 1990);
Onyeabor v. Pro Roofing, Inc., 787 P.2d 525 (Utah App. 1990).
Mrs. Patton has not made the necessary showing.

Rather than

marshalling the evidence, her brief does not list one scintilla
of evidence the jury could have relied on in reaching its verdict.

Furthermore, she does not: point to any evidence detracting

from the verdict.

She broadly suggests that the low damages

award could not have been supported by any evidence because she
-10-

feels she suffered serious injury.

Her attack on the liability

assessment is similarly vacuous; she asserts the jury completely
ignored liability because it was riveted on Mrs. Keating's "cold,
calculated" closing argument.

(Appellant's Brief at 17).

Mrs. Patton has neither marshalled the evidence for or against
the verdict.
Mrs. Patton's "argument" against the jury verdict is unsubstantiated rhetoric.

It lacks facts, it lacks legal authority

and it lacks legal analysis.

Appellate Rule of Procedure 24(a)

requires appellate briefs to contain arguments.

Mrs. Patton's

page worth of assertions is insufficient to create an issue
reviewable on appeal.

See English v. Standard Optical Co., 814

P.2d 613, 618-9 (Utah App. 1991) (court declined to consider
issues raised on appeal for failure to comply with Rule 24).
B.

There Is Substantial Evidence To Support The Verdict.

The jury drew upon substantial evidence to support its
finding that Mrs. Keating was only 51% negligent.

The evidence

at trial showed this accident to be unavoidable on Mrs. Keating's
part.

The jury heard evidence, both expert and lay, that she was

travelling slowly as she negotiated a turn in an icy parking lot
at night.

When she saw Mrs. Patton's vehicle parked just around

the corner, she braked but inevitably slid into her.

-11-

The jury

also heard evidence that Mrs. Patton was parked the wrong way in
a no-park zone.4
Evidence that the accident was not serious was also
introduced.

There seemed to be no damage to either vehicle

immediately after the accident, and Mrs. Patton said she was not
hurt.

The doctor who performed surgery on her back was not there

to testify about why the surgery was necessary.

The two doctors

who did testify could not link any current impairment to the
accident.
Considering the evidence received, the jury's verdict was
not surprising.

Mrs. Patton cannot prove that there was no

evidence to support it simply by stating that the jury should
have decided differently.
POINT III
MRS. KEATING'S CLOSING ARGUMENT
WAS PROPER.
Mrs. Patton lodges an inaccurate and untimely allegation
that Mrs. Keating's closing argument represented "gross
misconduct."

This Court should reject the last argument on

appeal.

4

Mrs. Patton contests for the first time on appeal the
insufficiency of the verdict based on fault apportionment. Her
motion for new trial only protested the insufficiency of damages.
Since Mrs. Patton did not present the issue of whether the jury
had sufficient evidence to apportion fault the way it did, this
Court should not address that issue.
-12-

A. Mrs. Patton Cannot Criticize The Closing Argument For
The First Time On Appeal.
During Mrs. Keating's entire closing argument, Mrs. Patton
never objected.

She never moved for a mistrial based on a

prejudicial closing argument.

As Mrs. Keating supposedly inun-

dated the jury with "the highest degree of prejudice possible,"
Mrs. Patton let the argument continue uninterrupted.
Her failure to object contemporaneously to the closing
argument precludes her from objecting now.

As the court in

Onyeabor v. Pro Roofing, Inc., 787 P.2d 525 (Utah App. 1990),
explained:
If something occurs which the party thinks is wrong and
so prejudicial to him that he thereafter cannot have a
fair trial, he must make his objection promptly and
seek redress by moving for a mistrial, or by having
cautionary instructions given, if that is adequate, or
be held to waive whatever rights may have existed to do
so. Otherwise, it would be manifestly unjust to permit
a party to sit silently by, believing that prejudicial
error has been committed, and then if he loses, come
forward claiming error.
787 P.2d at 527, quoting Hill v. Cloward. 377 P.2d 186, 188
(Utah 1962) .
It is well-established that an issue not preserved at the trial
level cannot be considered on appeal.5
358 (Utah App. 1993).

State v. Brown, 856 P.2d

Mrs. Keating requests that this Court

disregard the last three points raised in Mrs. Patton's brief for
untimeliness.

5

Because Mrs. Patton does not comply with Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 24(a)(5)(A), it is impossible to tell where,
if anywhere, she believes she preserved this issue with
sufficient specificity.
-13-

B. Mrs. Keating's Closing Comments Fell Well Within The
Wide Latitudes Allowed During Closing Argument.
Counsel enjoy considerable latitude in closing arguments.
They have a "right to discuss fully from their standpoints the
evidence and the inferences and deductions arising therefrom."
State v. Lafferty. 749 P.2d 1239, 1255 (Utah 1988), cert, denied
112 S.Ct. 1942 (1992).
Mrs. Keating's closing argument was appropriate in all
respects.

It summarized the relevant evidence, including the

facts that the accident was not immediately reported, that
Mrs. Patton said she was not hurt, that Mrs. Patton was parked
close to the corner in a no-park zone, that weather conditions
were poor, and that the impact was slight (R. 253-6) .

Counsel

highlighted the pertinent medical evidence as well, reminding the
jurors that the two testifying doctors could not link her current
problems to the accident.

(R. 257-261).

The closing argument

did not violate the Golden Rule, as Mrs. Patton asserts; counsel
never urged the jurors to place themselves in the defendant's
position.

Neither was the closing argument a diatribe for tort

reform in this nation, as Mrs. Patton contends; rather, counsel
asked the jury to consider whether such a low-speed collision
could result in damages of over one million dollars.

(R. 255).

Simply because the jury considered the question in Mrs. Keating's
favor does not mean the closing argument was grossly prejudicial.
Finally, Mrs. Patton cannot cite any caselaw showing that
the particular comments she complains of warrant a new trial.

-14-

In

the only case she can find where a closing argument was determined to be improper, the Supreme Court determined that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial based
on counsel's remarks that the defendant was a giant company and
that the plaintiff had made reasonable efforts to resolve the
dispute before trial but the defendant refused.

In affirming the

trial court in that case, the court recognized its duty to accord
great deference to the trial court's unique position to observe
whether the jury had been prejudiced by these remarks.

Donohue

v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc.. 748 P.2d 1067, 1068 (Utah
19 87). The comments in Donohue are unlike those in Mrs. Keating's
closing argument, where counsel simply requested that the jury
consider the plausibility of a one million dollar verdict in
light of the evidence presented.
C. The Closing Argument Did Not Violate The Open Court
Provision Of The Utah Constitution.
Mrs. Patton's final grievance with the closing argument is
that it violated the open courts provision.

Notwithstanding

Mrs. Keating's closing argument, Mrs. Patton still had her day,
or three days, in court.

To the extent she may be claiming that

the closing argument sapped her case of its strength, she had the
opportunity to present a rebuttal argument afterwards to rehabilitate her case.
The argument that Mrs. Keating's argument violated constitutional rights also must fail because there is no state action.
Mrs. Keating is not an arm of the state, and neither is her

-15-

counsel.

Only the government or its actors can violate a

citizen's constitutional rights.

Nielson v. Central Waterworks

Co., 645 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1982).
CONCLUSION
Mrs. Patton has not presented any reason for this Court to
grant a new trial.

Cross examination was appropriately limited,

the verdict was supported by the evidence, and the closing
argument was proper.

Paring down her various arguments to their

core, her message seems to be that she deserves a new trial
because she was not pleased with the outcome in the original
trial.

Because this is not a proper reason for a new trial,

Mrs. Keating respectfully requests that this Court affirm the
trial court's denial of the motion for new trial.
DATED this /£x

day of August, 1995.

.^

SNOW, GHRlSTENSfiN 8C MARTINEAU

rahnxR. Lund
'JiilTianne P. Blanch
Attorneys for Appellee
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ADDENDUM A;
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 103

Rule 103. Rulings on evidence.
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
affected, and
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to
strike appears of record, stating the specific
ground of objection, if the specific ground was not
apparent from the context, or
(2» Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one
excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence
was made known to the court by offer or was
apparent from the context within which questions were asked
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may
add any other or further statement which shous the
character of the evidence, the form in which it was
offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon It
ma> direct the making of an offer in question and
answer form
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases proceedings
shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to
prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested
to the jury by any means, such as making statements
or offers of proof or asking questions in the hearing of
the jury
(d> Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes
taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial
rights although they were not brought to the attention of the court

ADDENDUM B:
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(a)

Rule 24. Briefs.
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate headings and in
the order indicated:
( D A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose judgment or
order is sought to be reviewed, except where the
caption of the case on appeal contains the names
of all such parties. The list should be set out on a
separate page which appears immediately inside
the cover.
(2) A table of contents, including the contents
of the addendum, with page references.
(3> A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations, rules,
statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are
cited.
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction
of the appellate court.
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue, the standard of
appellate review with supporting authority; and
(A) citation to the record showing that the
issue was preserved in the trial court; or
(Bi a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial
court
(6> Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central
importance to the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation If the pertinent
part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone
will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in
an addendum to the brief under paragraph 111) of
this rule.
(7• A statement of the case. The statement
shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case,
the course of proceedings, and its disposition in
the court below A statement of the facts relevant
to the issues presented for review shall follow.
All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to
the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of
this rule.
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of
arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually
made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a
mere repetition of the heading under which the
argument is arranged.
(9) An argument The argument shall contain
the contentions and reasons of the appellant with
respect to the issues presented, including the
grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in

the trial court, with citations to the authorities,
statutes, and parts of the record relied on.
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement
that no addendum is necessary under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of
the brief unless doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of:
(A) any constitutional provision, statute,
rule, or regulation of central importance
cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief;
(B» any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but not available to the
court as part of a regularly published reporter service; and
(C) those parts of the record on appeal
that are of central importance to the determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the
transcript of the court's oral decision, or the
contract or document subject to construction.

